Honts, C. R., Kircher, J. C., & Raskin, D. C. (1995). Polygrapher's dilemma or psychologist's chimaera: A reply to Furedy's logico-ethical considerations for psychophysiological practitioners and researchers. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 20, 199-207.
Charles R. Honts
Department of Psychology
Boise State University
1910 University Drive
Boise, ID 83725
John C. Kircher
Department of Educational Psychology
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
and
David C. Raskin
Department of Psychology
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
We respond to Furedy's (1993) article in this journal where he raised an issue he referred to as the "Polygrapher's Dilemma." Furedy claimed that the control question test, the most commonly applied psychophysiological detection of deception test, is inherently subjective and harmful to subjects in both the field and the laboratory. Fortunately, Furedy's arguments were based on inaccurate representations of the control question test and on flawed logic. To correct Furedy's misrepresentations, we present an accurate description of how the control question test is used and evaluated. We then examine the results of empirical research that address Furedy's concerns. Furedy's concerns are found to be lacking on almost all counts. Finally, we discuss the findings from several studies that Furedy failed to mention but are directly relevant to the issues he raised.
The psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD) has a long history of application in criminal investigations and scientific research (Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, 1995). Investigative use of PDD tests by law enforcement is widespread in the United States, Canada, Japan , and a number of other countries (Barland, 1995; Yamamura & Miyata, 1990). Moreover, an increasing number of U.S. courts are admitting the results of polygraph tests into evidence (BNA, 1995; Honts & Perry, 1992).
The most common PDD test in forensic applications is known as the control question test (CQT; Honts & Perry, 1992). The CQT has been the topic of considerable and often polemic debate in the scientific literature (e.g., Lykken, 1979 versus Raskin & Podlesny, 1979; Furedy & Heslegrave, 1991 versus Raskin & Kircher, 1991; Furedy & Ben-Shakhar, 1993 versus Honts, 1993a; Bashore & Rapp, 1993 versus Rosenfeld, 1995).
John Furedy has been one of the most outspoken critics of the CQT (e.g., Ben-Shakhar & Furedy, 1990; Furedy & Heslegrave, 1991). In his latest attack on the CQT, Furedy (1993), in this journal, asserted that there were ethical and logico-ethical problems associated with the use of the CQT in both applied and research settings. Furedy further contended that there are no solutions to these problems. Furedy's (1993) article was followed by a letter to all of the members of the Society for Psychophysiological Research that was cosigned by a number of psychophysiologists (Furedy's letter to the SPR in 1994). In that letter, Furedy argued that the CQT should be abandoned by field practitioners and made an impassioned plea for a moratorium on research on the CQT. Furedy's arguments have serious implications for practitioners and researchers interested in polygraph techniques and, more generally, for scientists concerned with academic freedom.
Furedy's (1993) reasoning is seriously flawed and questionable on almost every major point. The general tone of his thesis is anti-scientific, anti-intellectual, anti-academic freedom and it is demeaning to the institutional review boards of the educational institutions that have approved research on CQ tests. Furedy bases his arguments on a grossly misleading discussion of the rationale for the CQT and the status of research on the CQT, and he ignores recent developments in the field of the psychophysiological detection of deception that render nearly all of his arguments moot. In the present manuscript, we address each of Furedy's (1993) major points. We show logical flaws in his arguments, and we present empirical evidence that contradicts most of his conclusions.
The CQT assesses credibility by comparing the subject's physiological responses to two types of questions: relevant questions and control questions. Relevant questions are case specific, accusatory, and directly address the central issues of the case under investigation. For example, in a case involving the theft of a diamond ring, a relevant question might be: "Did you take the diamond ring that was reported missing?" In most cases, it is reasonable to assume that a person involved in the theft of the diamond ring will respond physiologically when presented with this type of question. Unfortunately, uninvolved, truthful individuals are also likely to recognize the relevant questions as important and respond physiologically. Thus, a PDD test that includes only relevant questions interspersed with a few, truthfully answered, irrelevant questions (e.g., Is your name Robert?) is likely to produce a large number of false positive errors (truthful subjects called deceptive). These so-called relevant-irrelevant tests were used in criminal investigations early in the history of PDD, and they continue to be used in some industrial settings (Honts, 1991). However, research on relevant-irrelevant tests has confirmed expectations of high rates of false positive decision errors (Horowitz, 1989; Horvath, 1988).
In an attempt to resolve the false positive problem with the relevant-irrelevant test, Reid (1947) introduced an alternative to the irrelevant comparison question that he called the Control Question. However, since the control question was never intended to be a control in the scientific sense of the term (Raskin & Podlesny, 1979), a more neutral term, such as comparison question, might be more appropriate (Raskin & Kircher, 1991). The control question is an active stimulus that is designed to evoke strong physiological responses in truthful subjects. During the pretest interview, subjects are told that the individual who committed the crime under investigation is likely to have committed similar acts. The subject is told that some test questions will be asked to determine if the subject is the type of person who would have committed the crime and would lie about it. The subject is then asked a question like: "Before 1994, did you ever do anything that was dishonest or illegal?" When presented in this manner, the subject usually answers "No" to the control questions. If the subject answers "Yes," the question is reworded slightly to obtain a "No" response from the subject (Raskin, 1982).
The rationale of the CQT is that truthful individuals are certain that their answers to the relevant questions are truthful but are either deceptive or unsure of being truthful when answering the control questions. It is expected that truthful subjects will be concerned that they will appear deceptive when answering the control questions and will show stronger physiological responses to them than to the relevant questions. Conversely, subjects who answer relevant questions deceptively are expected to show their strongest physiological responses to the relevant questions, since the control questions pose a less immediate threat.
A CQT will typically contain three relevant, three control, and several unevaluated filler questions. Standard practice is to repeat these questions at least three times in different orders. Measures of respiration, electrodermal activity, and cardiovascular activity are taken and then evaluated. Although there are several methods of chart interpretation, the most common method employs a magnitude estimation approach known as numerical scoring. Using empirically validated criteria and scoring rules, the polygraph examiner compares reactions to control and relevant questions and assigns scores on a 7-point scale that ranges from -3 to +3. The scores are summed, the total is compared to fixed numerical cutoffs, and a truthful, deceptive, or inconclusive decision is rendered. Correlations among scores assigned by comparably trained numerical evaluators typically exceed 0.90 and agreement on decisions often approaches 100% (see the studies reviewed in Raskin, 1982). These data strongly suggest that the rules for numerical scoring are well defined and standardized. Although some polygraph examiners still use less systematic and subjective methods of chart interpretation, such methods should be abandoned because they are less reliable and valid than numerical methods (Raskin, 1976).
In addition to numerical scoring, a completely objective and reliable, computer based method for scoring polygraph data has recently been described in the scientific literature (Kircher and Raskin, 1988). A computer algorithm collects the physiological data, quantifies physiological reactions to test questions, and uses discriminant analysis to compute an a posterori probability of truthfulness that may be used for decision making. The validity of the scoring algorithm has been tested in a number of laboratory and field studies and has been shown to perform as well as, or better than highly trained human evaluators (see the review in Honts, 1994). Computer systems using this algorithm are available for use in the field. Other automated systems have been reported (see the review by Yankee, 1995, but studies demonstrating their validity have not been published in the peer-reviewed scientific literature. However, since computer-based systems have only recently been introduced, their use by field polygraph examiners is not yet widespread.
Furedy (1993) has argued that the CQT is fundamentally flawed because it is "not a standardized test." This theme has been echoed in a number of his publications (e. g., Ben-Shakhar & Furedy, 1990; Furedy & Heslegrave, 1991). Furedy fails to recognize that there are substantial differences between the state of the science in PDD and the state of the practice of PDD in the field. We agree that the manner in which many field examiners conduct polygraph tests leaves much to be desired (Honts, 1991, 1994; Honts & Perry, 1992; Raskin, 1986, 1989; Raskin et al., 1995). However, the validity of any psychological test can be compromised by improper administration. Other psychological tests are not abandoned because they are sometimes improperly administered and interpreted, and we should not abandon a useful psychological tool for criminal investigation because some field examiners are poorly trained and improperly apply the technique
A major weakness in Furedy's arguments is illustrated by his assertion that, "the C questions are constructed by the examiner in collaboration with the examinee" (1993, p. 265) and are thus impossible to standardize. This point is the heart of what Furedy describes as the Polygrapher's Dilemma. Furedy's assertion is that the examiner must develop control questions in a highly subjective and dynamic manner that involves carefully balancing the strength of the control questions against the strength of the relevant questions. However, this is a gross misrepresentation of the procedures usually used to develop control questions for CQTs. In the laboratory and field settings that we have studied, a set of questions is developed before the interview begins and those questions are modified only if the subject reveals new information during the pre-test interview. Even then, the modifications are made in a very constrained and specified manner. For example, in the recent study reported by Honts, Raskin, and Kircher (1994), 120 subjects were tested about a mock theft using the same set of relevant and control questions. This has been a standard practice in our laboratories for 20 years. We believe that "dynamic process" described by Furedy is great part a myth and is certainly not intergral to the use of the control question test. If there are polygraph examiners who use procedures similar to those described by Furedy, they should abandom them and adopt those procedures supported by scientific research.
Moreover, Furedy never defines what he means by the term "standardization." In their definitive work on psychometric theory, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) noted that a psychological test can be considered to be standardized to the extent that: "(1) its rules are clear, (2) it is practical to apply, (3) it does not demand great skill of administrators beyond that necessary for their initial training, and (4) its results do not depend on the specific administrator. The basic point about standardization is that users of a given instrument should obtain similar results" (p. 4). By the criteria outlined by Nunnally and Bernstein, the CQT clearly is a standardized test. As applied in the laboratories at Virginia Tech, the University of Utah, and the University of North Dakota, and as taught at the Canadian Police College: (1) the rules of practice for the CQT are well defined and they are clear, (2) the CQT is obviously practical to apply, since it is used by most law enforcement agencies in North America, and (3) the CQT does not demand great skill of the administrators beyond their initial training. Nunnally and Bernstein's (1994) fourth criterion is an empirical issue on which there are few data. However, the decision accuracies obtained in lab studies that closely approximate field conditions are consistently high (Kircher, Horowitz, & Raskin, 1988), and these results could not be obtained if the CQT were unreliable. The scoring of the CQT is undeniably reliable when the rules are followed and clearly meets all four of Nunnally and Bernstein's (1994) criteria for standardization.
Furedy (1993) also claims that the physiological recordings from CQ tests are "subjectively scored." As we discussed in the first section of this paper, Furedy's assertion is incomplete and misleading. The methods used by some polygraph examiners are subjective, but most examiners use numerical scoring. The numerical scoring of CQT data is highly standardized and is as reliable as the scoring of any non-machine scored procedure known to psychology. Furedy is also well aware that computer algorithms have been developed for collecting and analyzing CQT protocols. Automated scoring is objective and completely reliable, yet Furedy fails to mention these methods in his article.
There are numerous other misrepresentations and biased interpretations in Furedy (1993). Furedy portrays the development of control questions as a highly negative psychological experience for truthful subjects. This begs the fact that being falsely (or validly) charged with a crime is likely to be an extremely negative experience to begin with, and that passing a polygraph is very likely to overshadow any minor negative attributions associated with the proper development of control questions. However, as scientists we should look to data to answer such questions. During the last 20 years, over 600 subjects have been participants in mock crime experiments with the control question test at the University of Utah. The first author of this article has supervised data collection with more than 600 additional subjects in studies of control question tests. All of these studies have used realistic mock crimes and polygraph pretests that were designed to be as much like field polygraph tests as possible. If the use of control questions was as aversive as Furedy asserts, it is likely that from this pool of more than 1200 individuals, some of them would have filed complaints or would have at least made their discomfort known during the extensive experimental debriefings. However, not one subject in any of these studies has ever filed a complaint or even expressed any psychological discomfort about being administered a CQT. We believe that this finding speaks to the heart of Furedy's concerns and dismisses them.
Furedy also claims that debriefing subjects about the nature of the CQT is contrary to the rationale of the CQT. Furedy (1993) states that the rationale of the CQT "depends on current and prospective examinees not knowing about the nature of the critical R/C comparison" (p. 266). This assertion is contradicted by data. If the effectiveness of the CQT depends on a lack of knowledge about the nature of the CQT, then it would have to be discontinued immediately, because information about how the CQT works is widespread in both the scientific and popular literature. Notwithstanding this, a study reported by Rovner (1986; Rovner, Raskin, & Kircher, 1978) has clearly demonstrated that secrecy about the nature of the CQT is not necessary to maintain its validity. Rovner fully informed groups of innocent and guilty subjects about nature of the CQT, how the CQT was scored, and about ways to beat the test. When these subjects were compared to naive subjects, there were no differences in accuracy rates. Thus, Furedy has again raised a straw man. There is no compelling reason against debriefing subjects about the nature of the CQT. Furthermore, despite Furedy's assertions to the contrary (Furedy's letter to the SPR in 1994), we have always fully debriefed the subjects of our laboratory studies.
In light of the lengthy and often acrimonious debate in the scientific literature, and the negative opinions expressed by Furedy (1993) and others (Furedy's letter to the SPR in 1994), one might expect the scientific community to hold sharply divided opinions regarding the accuracy of polygraphs. However, in the last two decades, two scientifically-conducted surveys have clearly demonstrated that the relevant scientific community holds positive views regarding the utility of polygraph testing, including the CQT.
In 1982, a scientific telephone survey of the members of the Society for Psychophysiological Research (SPR) was conducted by the Gallup Organization (1984). The purpose of the Gallup survey was to assess the opinions held by the scientific community in order to meet a Frye standard regarding the offer of polygraph evidence by The Wall Street Journal, then defendants in a civil libel suit. The Frye standard required scientific findings and techniques to gain general acceptance in the appropriate scientific community before they were admitted as evidence. The principal findings of the 1982 Gallup survey are shown in Table 1. Approximately two-thirds of the scientists reported favorable opinions concerning the usefulness of polygraph tests. Only 1% of the respondents indicated that the polygraph was without value.
Amato (1993; also see Amato & Honts, 1994) replicated the 1982 Gallup study using a mail survey of the SPR membership. Their principal results are also shown in Table 1. Considering all respondents, their findings closely mirrored those reported by Gallup in 1982. In addition, Amato and Honts separated respondents who characterized themselves as highly informed about polygraph tests from those who indicated they were not highly informed. The highly-informed subjects reported much more favorable opinions regarding the validity of polygraph testing; 83% of them endorsed the favorable alternatives. Additional questions indicated no significant differences between respondents attitudes twoard control question and guilty knowledge tests.
Note: A Table appears in the printed article rather than the color graphic.
The results of these studies strongly contradict Furedy's (1993; Ben-Shakhar & Furedy, 1990) assertions of widespread negative attitudes in the scientific community. The data clearly indicate that a substantial majority of psychophysiologists and the majority of highly-informed psychophysiologists believe that the CQT is a useful diagnostic tool for assessing truthfulness. Scientists who are familiar with the polygraph literature have not been persuaded to ignore the majority of published data, nor have they been persuaded by vocal polygraph critics who cite only a few weak studies to support their negative biases and minority views.
There are two important new developments in the detection of deception that Furedy (1993) fails to mention. The first of those, computer-based statistical evaluation of the physiological data, we have already discussed. However, in terms of assessing the validity of Furedy's claims, the second development may be even more important and more telling. A comparison question known as the directed lie has been introduced as an alternative to Reid's (1947) control question. It is called a directed lie question because the subject is explicitly directed to lie when asked that question on the test. With the directed lie, there is no manipulation of the subject by the examiner that could theoretically cause resentment, embarrassment, or negative self-attributions .
Directed lie questions are introduced to the subject in the following manner. First, the subject is told that it is important for the examiner to have some examples of what their physiological responses look like when they tell a lie. The subject is then asked a question about some minor transgression that almost everyone has committed. Typical directed lie questions would be "Have you ever told a lie?" or "Have you ever done something that you now wish you had not done?" Following the subjects affirmative response, the examiner gives the subject the following instructions:
During the examination I want you to answer these questions with a "No". You and I will both know that when you answer these questions with a "No," that is a lie. In addition, when you answer these questions I want you to think about some time that you told someone a lie (or did something you now wish you hadn't done) and realize that you are telling a lie. I also want you to pay close attention to how you feel when you tell these lies because how you respond when you lie is very important for the outcome of the test.
Since exactly the same questions and instructions can be given to all subjects, the directed lie control procedure is even more standardized than is the standard CQT.
The rationale of the directed lie test is similar to that of the standard CQT. Innocent subjects are aware that the relevant questions are important but they also know that they are answering them truthfully. However, the examiner's instructions focus attention on the directed lie questions, and subjects are correctly led to believe that their responses to the directed lie are important for the outcome of the test. On the other hand, regardless of the examiner's instructions, the attention of guilty subjects is likely to remain focused on the relevant questions. The physiological data generated by a directed lie test are scored in the same manner as is described above for the CQT.
Our research suggests that decision accuracies achieved with directed lie questions are at least as high as, if not higher than, those obtained with traditional control questions. Honts and Raskin (1988) reported a field study in which subjects were tested with both standard control and directed lie questions. Inclusion of directed lie questions significantly improved discriminative performance. The resulting numerical scores accounted for an additional 20% of the variance in the guilt/innocence criterion. Moreover, the main effect of the directed lie controls was to improve performance with criterion innocent subjects.
Similar results were obtained in a laboratory study conducted by Horowitz (1988). In that study, Horowitz contrasted the performance of the standard CQT with a test that used all personally relevant directed lies like those described above, trivial directed lies (Does 2 + 2 = 4?, directed answer "No"), and a relevant-irrelevant test. Numerical scores from personally relevant directed lie tests again accounted for an additional 20% of the criterion variance as compared to the CQT, although in this study the effect was not significant (Honts, 1994).
The U. S. Department of Defense Polygraph Institute has also conducted research on the directed lie technique. Although most of that research is either unpublished or classified, Reed (1994) recently presented a paper on the Department of Defense's new screening test, which is based on the directed lie. Reed's directed lie tests yielded accuracy rates comparable to those reported earlier by Honts and Raskin (1988) and Horowitz (1988).
The directed lie offers obvious logical advantages over the CQT. We reiterate, the directed lie is even more standardized than the standard control question. Every subject can be asked the same directed lie questions in the same way. One of us has even suggested that the directed lie test could be completely administered by machine (Honts, 1993b). Clearly, the directed lie obviates all of Furedy's concerns about deception of the subject and any possible adverse psychological experiences with traditional control questions. Although Furedy's concerns about the CQT are greatly exaggerated, we nevertheless find it interesting that Furedy (1993) fails to even mention the directed lie technique as a possible alternative to the CQT. This is particularly puzzling since Furedy's acknowledged co-author Richardson (see page 267) was trained in the use of directed lie control questions at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. Moreover, Richardson is familiar with the results of numerous studies by the Department of Defense supporting the validity of the directed lie.
In both Furedy (1993) and the letter to the membership of SPR (Furedy's letter to the SPR in 1994), it is argued that the potential for interrogation following polygraph examinations creates ethical difficulties for psychophysiologists. The Furedy letter notes that exposing persons judged as deceptive to "an interrogation of indefinite length to which they have not explicitly consented appears to be incompatible with the DEC's [Draft Ethics Code] preamble" (p. 1). Furedy (1993) notes with apparent pride that he, "has been able to use the argument that a polygraph-induced confession may be unreliable to have such evidence discounted in six of six cases, meaning that the credibility of the confessions was destroyed by the fact that they were produced in the context of a polygraphic interrogation." (p. 264). Remarkably, Furedy goes on to say, "However, in none of those cases was any general assertion made that the confessions were in fact false." (p. 264).
It is a simple fact that some people commit crimes against society. It is also true that many crimes are solved because the police interrogate suspects and the suspects subsequently confess. Child sexual abuse is a typical example of such crimes. There are no witnesses, and there is often no physical evidence. In the absence of a confession on the part of accused, such cases may never even be prosecuted. In this vein, it is important to remember that psychologists have ethical responsibilities to society. The Ethical Standards for Psychologists states:
It is difficult to reconcile this ethical duty with the opinions expressed by Furedy (1993). We find it particularly disturbing that Furedy would advocate for the devaluation of confessions when there is no reason to believe that the confession is materially incorrect. At the case level, one of us gave testimony in support of the admission of a confession that followed a one hour and 45-minute polygraph examination and a 10-minute interrogation. During this period of time the suspect was read his rights twice, once as the interrogation began. The suspect confessed to the brutal beating murder of a 2 year old child. He was read his rights again, made a separate confession to two investigators and to the child's mother. There was no contradictory evidence, and no one, not even the defense made a case that this defendant was innocent. However, his defense counsel made an argument that attacked the reliability of the confession because it followed a polygraph test. Defense counsel's arguments were based closely on Furedy's (1993) arguments. The court accepted the defense's arguments, and the result was that a confessed child murderer is walking the streets.
This is not to say that the police do not on occasion engage in coercive and unacceptable tactics in interrogations. However, there are no data to support Furedy's assertions that, in the absence of otherwise unacceptable interrogation techniques, properly conducted polygraph tests are likely to result in false confessions. To deny police the use of confessions when there is no question about the validity of the confession is at strong odds with our ethical responsibilities to society. A far better protection for suspects would be provided by a requirement that all police interrogations be tape recorded. That way, improper tactics by the police could be easily exposed in court (Cassell, 1995).
Furedy (1993) neglects to note that any ethical difficulties associated with post-test interrogations with the CQT also apply to the guilty knowledge test (GKT), a detection of knowledge technique that Furedy supports as technologically superior to the CQT (Ben-Shakhar & Furedy, 1990). If the police conduct a GKT and the results indicate that the person has concealed knowledge, then it would seem reasonable that they would interrogate the subject and attempt to obtain a confession. Would Furedy and the cosigners of the letter to SPR (Furedy's letter to the SPR in 1994) have us believe that police interrogation of suspects they believe to be guilty of crimes will end with the demise of the CQT?
Finally, there is a serious problem with the GKT that Furedy (1993) fails to mention. Two recent field studies indicate that the GKT is likely to produce a high false negative rate, approaching 50%, in field settings (Elaad, 1990; Elaad, Ginton, & Jungman, 1992). These results are not at all surprising given what we know about memory for events under conditions of high stress (see the discussion in, Honts et al., 1995). Nonetheless, these results are hardly comforting in societies where the control of crime is a major issue and advocacy of the GKT to the exclusion of the CQT is difficult to reconcile when one considers our ethical responsibilities to society.
Unfortunately, we live in a world where people do commit crimes and sometimes innocent people are falsely suspected of those crimes. We expect police to investigate those crimes, identify the guilty, and to protect the innocent. We believe that the police should be permitted to use the CQT because the weight of the empirical evidence indicates that, when properly administered and evaluated, it is a reliable and valid investigative technique (Raskin et al., 1995). We have shown that Furedy's (1993) arguments against the CQT are based on misrepresentations of the procedures used by polygraph examiners and are contradicted by research on computer classification techniques and directed lie questions, discussions of which were conspicuously absent from his paper. To abandon the CQT is not only contrary to bulk of the scientific evidence, it is irresponsible in the light of psychologists' ethical responsibilities to society.
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Please address correspondence to: Charles R. Honts, Department of Psychology, Boise State University, 1910 University Drive, Boise, Idaho 83729. EMAIL: CHONTS@AOL.COM